יום רביעי, 13 באפריל 2022

מדדי מחירים בסחר חוץ – לשנת 2021

 

מדד מחירי יצוא הסחורות עלה ב-5.2%, לאחר ירידה של 6.4% בשנת 2020.

מדד מחירי יבוא הסחורות עלה ב-11.0%, לאחר ירידה של 3.4% בשנת 2020.

מדד המחירים של יצוא ענף ייצור מוצרי נפט מזוקק עלה ב-67.2%.

מדד המחירים של יבוא חומרי אנרגיה עלה ב-56.5%.

ברבעון האחרון של שנת 2021

עלייה במדדי המחירים של רוב מרכיבי היבוא.

מדד מחירי יצוא הסחורות (ללא אוניות, מטוסים ויהלומים) עלה בשנת 2021 ב-4.7%. זאת, לאחר שנתיים רצופות של ירידה במדד זה.

בשנת 2021 עלה מדד מחירי יבוא הסחורות (ללא אוניות, מטוסים, יהלומים וחומרי אנרגיה) ב-7.4%. זאת, לאחר שנתיים רצופות של ירידה במדד זה.​

יום ראשון, 10 באפריל 2022

נמל אשדוד: נקלטו חמישה מנופי גשר חצי-אוטומטיים

 

המנופים של חברת ZPCM הסינית, שנרכשו בעלות של כ-208 מיליון שקל, יסייעו בהאצת פעולות הפריקה והטעינה וצפויים להיכנס לעבודה תפעולית מלאה עד חודש ספטמבר הקרוב. נמל אשדוד: חלק מההתחדשות המאסיבית שהנמל מקדם במסגרת ההיערכות לתחרות.

בימים אלה נקלטים בנמל אשדוד חמישה מנופי גשר חצי-אוטומטיים שרכשה החברה בכ-208 מיליון שקל. המנופים, המצוידים בטכנולוגיה מתקדמת שתסייע לתהליך פריקה וטעינה מהיר, יוצבו בטרמינל מכולות חדש אשר הוקם כחלק מההשקעה בחידושו ושדרוגו של רציף 21.

מדובר במנופים מסוג ZENHUA36 מתוצרת חברת ZPMC הסינית, אחת היצרניות המובילות בעולם. המנופים מותאמים לעבודה עם אניות ענק בגודל של עד 24,000 TEU אשר ישמשו את נמל אשדוד לניטול מכולות ומטענים חריגים. גובה כל אחד מהמנופים הוא 140.6 מטר במצב זרוע מורם, ואורך הזרוע הימית של המנוף עומד על 71 מטר. המנופים מותאמים לאניות ברוחב 62 מטר אשר נושאות כ-24 שורות של מכולות.

המנופים מסוגלים להרים מטענים חריגים במשקל כולל של עד 95 טון באמצעות אונקל ייעודי, וכמו כן כל אחד מהמנופים כולל מתקן הרמה מסוג TANDEM המאפשר ניטול של שתי מכולות מלאות באורך 40 רגל עם משקל כולל של 80 טון. בנוסף, המנופים כוללים אפשרות להפעלה מחדר שליטה מרוחק באמצעות מצלמות ומערכות לייזר מתקדמות המותקנות על המנוף, ואפשרות לעבודה חצי-אוטומטית על ידי קבלת פקודות ישירות ממערכת TOS. באופן זה, המנוף מבצע את הפעולות הקשורות למכולות באנייה באמצעות המערכת, תוך כדי פיקוח של מנופאי.
מנופי ZPMC מגיעים לנמל אשדוד. יוצבו ברציף 21 ויחלו בעבודה תפעולית לקראת ספטמבר | צילום: פבל טולצ'ינסקימנופי ZPMC מגיעים לנמל אשדוד. יוצבו ברציף 21 ויחלו בעבודה תפעולית לקראת ספטמבר | צילום: פבל טולצ'ינסקי

המנופים אשר עשו את דרכם מסין בתחילת חודש פברואר, הגיעו כאמור לארץ וצפויים להיכנס לעבודה תפעולית מלאה עד חודש ספטמבר הקרוב.

שיקו ז׳אנה, מנכ״ל חברת נמל אשדוד: ״נמל אשדוד פועל ללא הרף להקלת העומסים שנוצרו כתוצאה ממשבר האספקה הגלובאלי המשבש את פעילות הנמלים המרכזיים בעולם מאז פרוץ הקורונה. מנופי הגשר, לצד מאמצים רבים נוספים, יסייעו לנו לצמצם את התורים התפעוליים ולקדם התנהלות טכנולוגית, מהירה ויעילה יותר״.

פורסם באתר port2port

צילום: פבל טולצ'ינסקי

חג החירות וחופש המחשבה

 

חג החירות וחופש המחשבה יחד עם התחלה חדשה בדיוק זה הזמן לברכה
איסוף של כוחות מחודשים, לימים ושנים בריאים ומאושרים
יחדיו - נעבור את התקופה חזקים ואיתנים

יום ראשון, 3 באפריל 2022

נמל חיפה ללקוחות: משכו מכולות יבוא מהנמל

 

לאור העומס הצפוי בחג הפסח בחברת נמל חיפה מבקשים מהלקוחות להוציא את מכולות היבוא המלאות על מנת לפנות שטח תפעולי בנמל. החל מיום ראשון הקרוב מכולות מלאות יוכנסו לנמל רק על פי רשימה.

מחלקת התפעול בחברת נמל חיפה פנתה במכתב ללקוחות הנמל בהם סוכני אנייה, סוכני מכס ומובילים בנושא הכנסת מכולות לנמל.

במכתב ציינה מחלקת תפעול כי ״לאור קצב המשיכה הנמוך של מכולות היבוא הנמל עמוס במכולות. מניתוח הפעילות קדימה אנו צופים שעומס זה יימשך עד אחרי חג הפסח״.

מחלקת תפעול מבקשת מלקוחות הנמל כי יכניסו לנמל מכולות מלאות על פי רשימה שתופץ מראש, וזאת החל מיום א׳ הקרוב, וכי יכניסו מכולות ריקות רק על פי תאום עם חוליית השטח בנמל.

למרות שאין מדובר בבקשה מפורשת ניתן להבין בין השורות כי קיימת בקשה להוציא את מכולות היבוא המלאות מהנמל על מנת להעניק לנמל שטח תפעולי רחב ככל הניתן ולהוציא את המכולות למחסני הערובה מחוץ הנמל לטובת הנמל והלקוחות.

מחברת נמל חיפה נמסר בנוסף כי ״אנו רואים היענות חיובית לבקשה. כולם מבינים שזה לטובת כולם״.

פורסם באתר – www.port2port.co.il

Interim Report March 2022: Economic and Social Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine

 

Summary
  • The most important consequence of the war in Ukraine is the lives lost and the humanitarian crisis associated with the huge numbers of besieged and displaced people. There are also, however, numerous significant economic implications.

  • Prior to the outbreak of the war, most key global macroeconomic variables were seen as returning to normality over 2022-23 following the COVID-19 pandemic.

    • Global growth in 2023 was projected to return to rates similar to those prevailing in the immediate pre-pandemic period.

    • Most OECD economies were expected to get back to full employment by 2023, and inflation was seen as converging on levels close to policy objectives, though later and from higher levels than previously expected in most countries.

    • Policy settings were also expected to normalise, with exceptional monetary policy accommodation being progressively removed and emergency fiscal measures, taken in response to the pandemic, phased out.

  • Although Russia and Ukraine are relatively small in output terms, they are large producers and exporters of key food items, minerals and energy. The war has already resulted in sizeable economic and financial shocks, particularly in commodity markets, with the prices of oil, gas and wheat soaring.

  • The moves in commodity prices and financial markets seen since the outbreak of the war could, if sustained, reduce global GDP growth by over 1 percentage point in the first year, with a deep recession in Russia, and push up global consumer price inflation by approximately 2½ percentage points.

  • Well-designed and carefully targeted fiscal support could reduce the negative impact on growth with only a minor extra impetus to inflation. In some countries, this could be funded by taxation of windfall gains.

  • Faced with a new negative shock of uncertain duration and magnitude, monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring well-anchored inflation expectations. Most central banks should continue their pre-war plans, with the exception of the most affected economies, where a pause may be needed to fully assess the consequences of the crisis.

  • In the near term, many governments will need to cushion the blow of higher energy prices, diversify energy sources and increase efficiency wherever possible. For food, higher production in OECD countries, refraining from protectionism and multilateral support for logistics will help the countries most affected by a disruption to supply from Russia and Ukraine.

  • The war has underlined the importance of minimising dependence on Russia for key energy imports. Policymakers should reconsider the appropriateness of market design with a view to ensuring energy security and putting incentives in place to ensure the green transition in a publicly supported way.

The war between Russia and Ukraine is a major humanitarian and economic shock

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a major humanitarian crisis affecting millions of people and a severe economic shock of uncertain duration and magnitude. This note provides a first assessment of the potential impact of the conflict on the global economy, based on the shocks seen so far, and the policy implications.

Prior to the conflict, the global recovery from the pandemic was expected to continue in 2022 and 2023, helped by continued progress with global vaccination efforts, supportive macroeconomic policies in the major economies and favourable financial conditions. The December 2021 OECD Economic Outlook projected global GDP growth of 4.5% in 2022 and 3.2% in 2023 (Figure 1, Panel A). Subsequent national accounts data and high-frequency indicators in early 2022 remained broadly consistent with this outlook, with business activity bouncing back quickly after the disruption from the Omicron variant in most countries (Figure 1, Panel B). At the same time, higher food and energy prices, supply constraints associated with the pandemic and a rapid recovery in demand from mid-2020 resulted in an acceleration and broadening of inflation in most OECD economies, especially in the United States, Latin America and many Central and Eastern European economies.

The war in Ukraine has created a new negative supply shock for the world economy, just when some of the supply-chain challenges seen since the beginning of the pandemic appeared to be starting to fade. The effects of the war will operate through many different channels, and are likely to evolve if the conflict deepens further.

In some respects, the direct role of Russia and Ukraine in the global economy is small. Together, they account for only about 2% of global GDP at market prices and a similar proportion of total global trade, with limited bilateral trade for most countries (Figure 2). Financial linkages with other countries are also generally modest. Stocks of foreign direct investment in Russia, and by Russia in other economies, account for between 1-1½ per cent of the global total. Consolidated cross-border bank claims by BIS reporting banks on residents of Russia and Ukraine represented less than 0.5% of the global total as of the third quarter of 2021.

In one respect, however, Russia and Ukraine do have an important influence on the global economy. This is via their role as major suppliers in a number of commodity markets. Russia and Ukraine together account for about 30% of global exports of wheat, 20% for corn, mineral fertilisers and natural gas, and 11% for oil. In addition, supply chains around the world are dependent on exports of metals from Russia and Ukraine. Russia is a key supplier of palladium, used in catalytic converters for cars, and nickel, used in steel production and the manufacture of batteries. Russia and Ukraine are also sources of inert gases such as argon and neon, used in the production of semiconductors, and large producers of titanium sponge, used in aircraft. Both countries also have globally important reserves of uranium. The prices of many of these commodities have increased sharply since the onset of the war, even in the absence of any significant disruption of production or export volumes (Figure 3).

A complete cessation of wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine would result in serious shortages in many emerging-market and developing economies. There would be an acute risk not only of economic crises in some countries but also humanitarian disasters, with a sharp increase in poverty and hunger. The disruption in fertiliser manufacturing risks making these disruptions more long lasting, by putting next years’ agricultural supply under stress. In many economies in the Middle East, wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine represent around 75% of total wheat imports (Figure 4).

Despite the small economic size of Russia, the war and related sanctions are already causing disruptions of a global nature through financial and business linkages. Financial sanctions placed on Russia have targeted selected individuals and banks, reduced access to foreign capital and frozen access to the foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in the Western economies. As a result, the rouble has depreciated sharply, the CBR’s policy interest rate has risen by 10.5 percentage points to 20%, and risk premia on Russian sovereign debt have soared. Delays and difficulties in making international payments are disrupting trade and could result in debt defaults in Russia. Conditions have also tightened in financial markets around the world, reflecting greater risk aversion and uncertainty, with higher risk premia and currency depreciations also occurring in many emerging-market economies and Central and Eastern European economies with relatively strong business ties with Russia. Commercial air travel and freight are also being rerouted or ceasing operations altogether, increasing the costs of doing business, and many multinational companies have suspended operations in Russia.

There are also some possible longer-term consequences from the war, including pressures for higher spending on defence, the structure of energy markets, potential fragmentation of payment systems and changes in the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves. A re-division of the world into blocs separated by barriers would sacrifice some of the gains from specialisation, economies of scale and the diffusion of information and know-how. The exclusion from the SWIFT message system could accelerate efforts to develop alternatives. This would diminish the efficiency gains from having a single global system, and potentially reduce the dominant role of the US dollar in financial markets and cross-border payments.

The magnitude of the economic impact of the conflict is highly uncertain, and will depend in part on the duration of the war and the policy responses, but it is clear that the war will result in a substantial near-term drag on global growth and significantly stronger inflationary pressures.

Illustrative simulations suggest that global growth could be reduced by over 1 percentage point, and global inflation raised by close to 2½ percentage points in the first full year after the start of the conflict (Figure 5). These estimates are based on the assumption that the commodity and financial market shocks seen in the first two weeks of the conflict persist for at least one year, and include a deep recession in Russia, with output declining by over 10% and inflation rising by close to 15 percentage points. (The full set of factors considered are set out in the Technical Appendix.)

  • The impact of the shocks differs across regions, with the European economies collectively being the hardest hit, particularly those that have a common border with either Russia or Ukraine. This reflects greater gas price rises in Europe than in other parts of the world and the relative strength of business and energy linkages with Russia prior to the conflict.

  • Advanced economies in the Asia-Pacific region and the Americas have weaker trade and investment links with Russia, and some are commodity producers, but growth is still hit by weaker global demand and the impact of higher prices on household incomes and spending.

  • Growth outcomes in the emerging-market economies reflect a balance between stronger output in some commodity-producing economies and deeper declines in the major commodity-importing economies, and the adverse impact of higher investment risk premia. Higher food and energy prices also push up inflation more than in the advanced economies.

  • Monetary policy reacts to the upturn in inflation around the world, with policy interest rates raised by a little over 1 percentage point on average in the major advanced economies and 1½ percentage point in the major emerging-market economies.

These simulations provide an initial look at the potential impact of the conflict based on the market dislocations observed in the first two weeks of the war. They do not incorporate many factors that could intensify the adverse effects of the conflict, such as further sanctions or consumer and business boycotts, disruptions to shipping and air traffic, the unavailability of key products from Russia, trade restrictions such as export bans on food commodities, or undermined consumer confidence.

A key potential economic risk is that energy exports from Russia to the EU could cease completely. The impact of such a shock is difficult to quantify, but could be abrupt given limited possibilities to substitute to supplies from world markets in the short term and low levels of gas reserves. One illustration of the possible additional pressures is provided by the one-day peak in European gas prices since the start of the conflict. Prices that day were 170% higher than in January, twice the size of the gas price shock assumed in the simulations above. A persistent return to prices at this level would add an additional 1¼ percentage point to inflation in Europe (taking the full shock on euro area inflation to over 3½ percentage points) and further reduce European growth by over ½ percentage point.

Input-output tables can also be used to assess the direct effects on output of a reduction in energy inputs. An illustrative decline of 20% in imported energy inputs (from direct and indirect imports of fossil fuels, refined fuel products and electricity and gas supply) would reduce gross output in the European economies by over 1 percentage point, with significant differences across countries (Figure 6). The hardest hit would be the domestic energy-producing sectors, air transport, chemicals and metals manufacturing. These estimates may understate the disruptions from lower energy availability as there could be discontinuities in the impact on output, rather than the smooth adjustment implicitly assumed in the calculations. However, it is also possible that some reduction in imported energy could be offset by stronger domestic production, drawing on reserves or improved energy efficiency.

The humanitarian cost of the war is high and growing. Around three million people have already fled Ukraine in the first three weeks of the war (Figure 7) and that number is likely to increase further. This is considerably more than the annual flow of asylum-seekers into European countries at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015-16. Looking after the refugees from Ukraine will require spending on social and housing assistance, food provision, medical assistance and childcare and schooling.

The spending challenge is difficult to predict due to uncertainty about the number of refugees, the length of time they will stay, and the amount of spending per refugee. The cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers for the first year in 2015-16 was estimated to be around EUR 10 000 per application by the OECD, and up to EUR 12 500 per refugee in national studies for Germany –though to varying extent across countries, depending on the level of support. At this level, the inflow of 3 million refugees seen so far could result in a direct first year cost of at least 0.25% of EU GDP, and much more in the major host economies. So far, refugees have primarily gone to a small number of countries, with Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia taking in large shares. The initial costs are manageable for the EU as a whole, but difficult to support – and deliver – by individual neighbouring countries. Burden sharing and EU support to the major host countries would allow support to be delivered more effectively.

The war complicates the task of policymakers

The substantial economic costs of the conflict and elevated uncertainty add to the challenges already facing policymakers from rising inflationary pressures and the imbalanced recovery from the pandemic. Faced with an adverse supply shock of uncertain duration and magnitude from higher commodity prices, monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring well-anchored inflation expectations and intervention if needed to ensure the smooth functioning of financial markets. Additional temporary, timely and well-targeted fiscal measures, where feasible, provide the best policy option to cushion the immediate impact of the crisis on consumers and businesses, especially with rising inflation limiting the room for monetary policy manoeuvre. Regulatory measures, to improve market design in order to enhance energy security and competitiveness, can also help reduce the vulnerability to some of the energy market disruptions in the short-term and beyond.

Steps towards the normalisation of monetary policy should continue in the advanced economies, albeit at a differentiated pace and with frequent reassessment as the conflict evolves. The case for continued normalisation is particularly strong in economies such as the United States, where the recovery from the pandemic is well advanced and signs of durable inflation pressures were already apparent ahead of the recent commodity price surge. A slower pace of policy normalisation is appropriate in economies where underlying (non-food non-energy) inflation remains low, wage pressures are still modest, and the adverse impact of the conflict on growth is greatest. In all countries, renewed asset purchases, expanded currency swap lines and a temporary easing of bank prudential regulations can be used if necessary to reduce tensions and liquidity shortages in financial markets.

The monetary policy stance has already been tightened substantially in some major emerging-market economies over the past year, amidst rising inflationary pressures. Higher food and energy prices are likely to require additional policy rate increases, given the greater weight of commodities in consumer price inflation. This would help to ensure stability and mitigate against potential adverse spillovers from financial market risks and monetary policy normalisation in the major advanced economies.

Ahead of the conflict, the fiscal stance was set to tighten gradually in most advanced economies in 2022 and 2023 due to the gradual withdrawal of pandemic-related support measures and some discretionary fiscal consolidation. These plans are already being reconsidered in many countries due to the impact of the conflict. Debt service burdens remain moderate, despite sizeable fiscal deficits and higher debt levels, providing room for additional temporary and well-targeted fiscal support where needed, particularly while interest rates remain low. Immediate spending priorities include the costs of supporting refugees in Europe, and cushioning the immediate effects of the commodity and food price shocks on households and companies through temporary and well-targeted policies (see below). In the medium term, greater investment in clean energy and higher defence spending are both likely to be high on the agenda.

The scope for additional fiscal support varies considerably among emerging-market economies and developing countries, with many facing difficult trade-offs between supporting incomes and ensuring debt sustainability and investor confidence. Higher commodity prices should, however, bolster fiscal revenues in commodity-exporting countries, providing some leeway to cushion the shock of higher food and energy prices on household incomes.

Illustrative simulations of a well-targeted rise in final government spending of 0.5% of GDP for one year in all the OECD economies show that this could offset around one-half of the estimated decline in output from the conflict without adding significantly to inflation (Figure 8). Non-OECD economies would also benefit, albeit to a lesser extent, even if they do not have sufficient fiscal space to undertake additional fiscal easing. This reflects the spillovers from stronger demand and trade in the advanced economies. Inflation would also rise due to the demand shock, but to a relatively limited extent.

Lower-income countries and households spend the highest share of their incomes on energy and food (Figure 9). Governments had already introduced a range of measures to offset the effects of the large energy price increases seen before the start of the war. These measures are now being strengthened further. The policies used include income support, such as lump sum transfers, often means-tested. There have also been many price measures including lower electricity tariffs for low-income households, VAT cuts on electricity and gas, reductions in excise taxes on liquid fuels and electricity and energy price freezes. In some countries, subsidies have been provided to electricity companies to compensate for suppressing price increases.

To keep costs manageable, and avoid distorting price signals, additional support to offset the further energy price rises since the start of the war should be well targeted and temporary. Lower tax rates and price caps directly reduce the cost of energy, but benefit higher-income households as well as those most in need of help due to fuel poverty. Cash transfers can be better targeted, and have higher multiplier effects if focused on low-and-middle income households, but may take greater time to put in place and do not affect market prices.

The war has starkly highlighted that many OECD economies are heavily reliant on fossil fuel energy with a high risk of price shocks and even shortages (Figure 10). Russia has provided over 40% of European natural gas imports until recently, a key source of heating for many EU households, a similar proportion of coal imports, and around one quarter of oil imports. Gas supply is also a major source of electricity production, with a key role in balancing demand and supply, and an input into industrial production such as fertilisers. Improving the security of energy supply in Europe is a medium-term venture, but significant gains can be achieved already in 2022. The IEA has set out a 10 Point Plan on how to reduce reliance on gas imports from Russia by between one-third and one-half over the next year.

In the longer term, OECD countries should reduce their overall reliance on fossil fuel imports by providing appropriate incentives to move away from fossil fuels and investing significantly in clean energy and energy efficiency. In Europe, improving the interconnection among domestic electricity grids can reduce energy costs and improve security. More generally, a strategic clean energy transition should aim to reduce vulnerabilities along the way, and be coupled with investment in innovation to develop the technologies needed for net-zero.

Wartime macroeconomics

 

A fresh supply shock stemming from the war in Ukraine will deal a blow to the economic recovery from COVID-19. The energy and food sectors are especially hard hit.

World economic growth in the year ahead will now be more than 1 percentage point lower than previous projections, while inflation, already elevated at the beginning of the year, is now expected to be 2.47 pp higher than previous projections, according to OECD estimates.

The OECD believes a fiscal response targeting support for the more vulnerable of 0.5 pp of GDP could substantially mitigate the economic impact of the crisis without substantially adding to inflation.

יום ראשון, 13 במרץ 2022

International trade statistics: trends in fourth quarter 2021




Acceleration in merchandise trade bolsters recovery in G20 trade, but growth in services trade eases

24 Feb 2022 – Following a slow third quarter, G20 international merchandise trade accelerated in value terms in Q4 2021, partly due to high commodity prices, in particular for energy. While shipping costs kept the value of trade in transport services at record highs, trade in other services showed a slowdown notably in Europe, possibly reflecting a tightening of Covid-19 related restrictions towards the end of the year.

Growth in G20 international merchandise picked up in Q4 2021, with exports up 3.4% and imports up 5.0%, with respect to the previous quarter and measured in seasonally-adjusted current US dollars. This compares to the slower growth (1.5% for exports and 0.9% for imports) recorded in Q3 2021. Energy price increases continued to fuel merchandise trade growth in value terms, while pressure on supply chains, including for semiconductors, appears to have eased towards the end of the year.

Growth in exports and imports of services for the G20 is estimated at around 2.5% and 2.4% in Q4 2021, respectively, compared with the previous quarter and measured in seasonally-adjusted US dollars. The preliminary estimates compare to the rates of 3.8% and 3.5% recorded in Q3 2021 for exports and imports. Services trade continued to expand at a sustained pace in North America and most of East Asia, while growth slowed down in Europe.

In 2021, annual merchandise exports and imports for the G20 expanded by 25.9% and 26.1%, respectively, with values around 16% above their 2019 levels. While high commodity prices explain part of the increase, stimulus packages also played a role by spurring the demand for traded goods. Annual growth in exports and imports of services is estimated at around 15.0% and 11.3%, respectively. While transport costs skyrocketed, travel, which includes the expenditure of non-residents abroad, recovered but remained subdued. Trade in computer, business and financial services performed well across most of the G20 economies in 2021.
G20 merchandise trade
Based on figures in current prices (billion US dollars), seasonally adjusted

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A recovery in trade in vehicles and parts helped push merchandise trade growth in North America in Q4 2021, with exports from the United States (up 7.1%), Canada (up 6.7%) and Mexico (up 6.0%) all recording strong growth. Import growth for Canada (up 7.2%) and the United States (up 5.9%) was largely driven by higher purchases of home electronics and mobile phones.

Merchandise exports instead contracted in Argentina and Brazil (minus 7.3% and minus 5.0%, respectively), with lower shipments of metal ores and soybeans (mostly to China) weighing in particular on the Brazilian figures. Imports, on the other hand, expanded by 13.0% in Argentina and by 11.5% in Brazil, the latter driven by energy products, electrical machinery and fertilisers.

Merchandise trade picked up in Europe in Q4 2021, following the weak growth seen in Q3 2021. Exports and imports in the European Union (EU-27) expanded by 2.3% and 5.1%, respectively. All the major European G20 economies showed robust merchandise trade growth: France (exports and imports up 2.6% and 6.3%, respectively), Germany (up 2.2% and 5.8%) and Italy (up 2.5% and 4.5%), with higher purchases of energy products driving the import figures and trade in vehicles and parts recovering. Merchandise exports and imports of the United Kingdom expanded by 3.2% and 5.3%, respectively, with chemicals, machinery and transport equipment driving exports and energy products contributing to imports growth.

Electronics and vehicles (including e-cars) continued to spur exports growth for Korea (up 5.2%), while Japan saw more moderate growth in both exports (up 0.5%) and imports (up 2.2%). Chinese merchandise exports (up 4.6%) and imports (up 0.9%) rebounded in Q4 2021, after the much weaker figures in the previous quarter. Electronics and integrated circuits helped boost growth in exports, with integrated circuits also fuelling import growth along with soybeans and metal ores. India, with exports up 2.2% and imports up 10.7%, and Indonesia (up 8.9% and 13.1%), also posted solid merchandise trade figures in Q4 2021. Falling prices for metals and lower shipments of coal and fuels affected export growth for Australia (minus 3.5%), while imports expanded by 7.5%, largely driven by higher spending on vehicles, telecommunication equipment and home electronics. Exports from South Africa also contracted by 2.1% in Q4 2021, reflecting drops in its major exports of metal ores, fruits and electrical machinery, while imports increased by 3.3%.

In 2021 as a whole, merchandise trade values for the vast majority of the G20 members more than recovered the drops recorded in 2020. Exports and imports expanded by 23.1% and 21.3%, respectively, in the United States, with energy products and pharmaceuticals recording significant growth on the exports side. Similarly, annual exports and imports rose by 20.8% and 25.1% in the European Union. Electronics (integrated circuits, mobile phones, displays and computers) continued to propel merchandise exports from Korea (up 25.6%) and China (up 32.2%). Machinery and vehicles and parts contributed to total merchandise exports growth for Japan (up 18.3%), while imports increased by 21.3% over the year. Leading exporters of primary commodities benefitted from high demand and steep price increases, with merchandise exports soaring in 2021 for Russia (up 47.5%), India (up 42.1%), Indonesia (up 38.4%) and South Africa (up 44.9%).
G20 trade in services
Based on figures in current prices (billion US dollars), seasonally adjusted

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Source: OECD Statistics and Data Directorate and national sources.

Note: the Q4 2021 trade in services values are preliminary estimates based on available data, covering about 60% of exports and imports for the G20 aggregate.

Services trade showed a mixed picture in Q4 2021. Following the expansion recorded in the previous two quarters, services trade in Europe slowed down in Q4 2021. Services exports increased by 1.8% in France, with weak sales of financial and insurance services partially offsetting growth in travel (up 15.9%) and transport (up 4.3%). German exports contracted by 2.3%, while imports increased moderately by 1.2%. The United Kingdom recorded a slowdown in both services exports (minus 2.4%) and imports (minus 2.5%), while exports and imports of Italy increased by 1.6% and 3.6%, respectively.

Turkey’strade in services continued to expand in Q4 2021. Exports grew by 4.0%, while imports rose by 8.0% reflecting strong purchases of computer and business services. Similarly, Russia’s services trade expanded markedly, with exports increasing by 8.4% and imports surging by 19.4%.

An easing of travel restrictions and high transport costs sustained trade in services growth in North America. The United States saw a 6.6% rise in services exports, with travel and transport up by 39.4% and 11.3% in Q4 2021. Imports grew more moderately by 4.3%. Similarly, Canada’s services exports and imports expanded by 6.5% and 6.1%, respectively, compared to the previous quarter.

Transport, computer and business services continued to boost trade in services growth across East Asia. Exports increased by 5.5% in Korea, with construction, of which Korea is a leading exporter, picking up strongly (up 55.9%) following three quarters of contraction. China also saw marked growth of 6.1% in services exports, fueled by higher sales of transport, computer and business services. Imports expanded by 4.6% in Korea and by 3.8% in China. Japan, on the contrary, experienced a decline in both services exports and imports (minus 3.9% and minus 5.0%, respectively), reflecting lower trade in all services but transport.

Owing to prolonged entry restrictions, which depressed travel receipts, services exports contracted further in Australia, recording a 4.9% fall in Q4 2021. However, services imports increased by 4.9% driven by transport (up 21.8%). In Brazil, services exports grew by 0.7%, while imports rose by 3.4% on higher purchases of business and transport services.

For 2021 as a whole, most G20 economies showed a robust rebound in trade in services compared to the previous year, although in many cases values remain below pre-crisis (2019) levels due to subdued travel figures.Exports of services from Korea and China, up 34.8% and 42.5% in the year, respectively, are an exception: soaring transport receipts, as well as buoyant figures across all services, drove total exports well above their 2019 levels. Japanese exports and imports expanded more moderately over the year (up 4.2% and 5.3%, respectively), while strict travel restrictions continued to weigh heavily on Australia’s services exports (down 8.4% compared to 2020). Services exports and imports increased by 8.6% and 16.2% in the United States, with financial and business services driving export growth, and transport and travel propelling import growth. In Europe, annual exports from France (up 18.0%), Germany (up 15.6%) and the United Kingdom (up 8.1%) were all close to their 2019 levels, largely reflecting dynamic trade in business and financial services. With travel receipts twice as high as in 2020 (but still 30% below their 2019 levels), Turkish exports of services jumped by 56.2% in 2021.